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In the future there will be no female leaders.  
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Given the importance of gender equality to international economics and sustainable 
economic and social development, this dissertation addresses the gender imbalances in 
senior company board decision-making positions. This furthermore aims to identify the 
potential impacts of the 33.3% gender quota for supervisory and management boards 
approved in Portugal in August 2017. Consequently, this enables a deeper understanding 
of the conditions necessary for gender quotas to bring about sustainable gender balances 
in boardrooms and alongside changes in the corporate culture. This dissertation applies 
interpretative data analysis from the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and 
semi-structured interviews with representatives of nine PSI 20 firms (the 20 largest 
companies listed on the Portuguese Stock Exchange). The goals are thus to study the 
glass-ceiling existence and constraints within the Portuguese corporate context, 
perceptions on quota outcomes and legitimacy, and the perceived impacts of women on 
firm performances.  
The results of this study demonstrate how quota acceptability is independent of gender 
as there were no verified gender patterns among the responses obtained; that cultural 
factors and gender role expectations influence board dynamics and facilitate male access 
to board positions; and, the Portuguese quota requirement may successfully trigger gender 
parity in the boardroom due to the existence of a sanctioning mechanism for non-
compliance and a strong record of path dependency (earlier legal initiatives). However, 
findings are inconclusive as regards any possible structural change in corporate mentality 
and culture as respondents remain divided about the influence of gender diversity on firm 
performance, the legitimacy of quotas and their effects on meritocracy. 
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Introduction 
The fifth United Nations Sustainable Development Goal states the need “to achieve 
gender equality and empower all women and girls” as gender inequalities remain reflected 
in many forms around the globe. In western countries, wage gaps, underrepresentation of 
women in top-decision making positions and the unequal division of unpaid care and 
domestic labour constitute the greatest challenges. Overcoming these is fundamental to 
guaranteeing the sustainable development of societies taking into consideration that 
gender equality represents an essential pre-condition to economic growth as well as an 
opportunity in the context of a globalized world still recovering from a deep financial and 
economic recession. This study focuses on the promotion of gender equality in top 
decision-making positions, specifically in firms, as women still find themselves 
underrepresented in the boardroom despite their high qualifications. This not only forms 
part of an overdue guarantee of equal opportunities for all individuals but also reflects the 
growing recognition that gender parity is another facet of company Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) commitments (Grosser, 2016). 
The debate around gender in the corporate context is deeply connected with the 
concept of diversity, over the more controversial concept of equality. According to Rao 
& Tilt (2016), board diversity corresponds to a variety of characteristics, attributes and 
values associated with individual board members that contribute for heterogeneous board 
composition and influence board decision-making, including gender. Business literature 
on gender diversity is recent and focuses mostly on the eventual benefits of gender diverse 
boards, specifically the impact of women directors on firm (financial and social) 
performance. An opposite concept to board diversity is homophily, a board’s trait visible 
when its members present similar characteristics, including gender, reflecting the so 
called “old boys networks” (Perrault, 2015). The concept helps explaining the existence 
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of all-male boards and why female representation in boards has stagnated. The influence 
of the underrepresented gender may be explained through the concept of critical mass 
(Kanter, 1977). According to the Critical Mass Theory, the influence of a minority group 
depends on size and increases when it reaches a certain threshold, allowing for further 
growth and structural equality (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013)1. This 
is a reference when assessing sustainable women’s participation in the boardroom in 
opposition to tokenism. Tokenism is symbolic female representation, i.e., selection of 
few women directors, not because of their competences, but because of their gender 
(Kogut et al, 2014), showing the company’s concern with social welfare as an attempt to 
influence public opinion (de Anca & Gabaldon, 2014). This is why a relatively small 
number of women in the board has no impact on board processes: they are still seen as 
the “Other”. Golden Skirts are examples of tokenism, i.e., qualified women directors 
who, after a quota, hold several directorships in a number of different boards (Lansing & 
Chandra, 2012). Proposals of quota implementation aim to impose sustainable 
participation of the underrepresented gender at the critical mass level and to break the so 
called glass-ceiling – metaphor for the obstacles imposed just below the top management 
level, to female qualified workers aiming for senior positions (Dreher, 2003). 
The specific objective of this dissertation involves identifying the likely impacts of the 
33.3% gender quota for management boards enacted into law in Portugal in August 2017. 
This thus assesses gender discrimination in the Portuguese corporate context, perceptions 
of quotas legitimacy and outcomes, the perceived impacts of women on firm performance 
and the efficiency of quotas in promoting board diversity – from the company point of 
view. Therefore, the main research question approaches whether or not gender quotas 
                                                
1 There is not an established critical mass value, although Kanter (1977) suggested the tipping point to be at one-third 
of female participation, and Torchia et al’s (2011) proposal of at least three women is often quoted in the literature.  
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may lead to sustainable gender balances in boardrooms and changes in corporate culture. 
Hence, the following hypothesis is tested: as a measure of positive discrimination, quotas 
may increase the participation of the underrepresented gender in the boardroom even 
while potentially raising questions regarding meritocracy, legitimacy and individuals’ 
acceptance of this form of affirmative action. The relevance of this study derives from 
how it tests a specific tool for promoting gender equality – quotas –, not only debating its 
ethical dimension, but particularly assessing the expected practical outcomes. 
Furthermore, this dissertation responds to the lack of qualitative approaches capable of 
measuring factors otherwise not perceived by quantitative methods.  Hence, the method 
chosen consists of interpretative data analysis paired with answers to semi-structured 
interviews. The first section presents the literature’s findings on quotas thus far – 
specifically as regard their legitimacy, controversies and assessed impacts –, and presents 
the Portuguese legislation on gender equality. Section two explains the methodology, 
introduces data on the European and Portuguese corporate contexts (macro analysis) 
before examining the respondent interview answers (micro analysis). The final section 
both presents the key study results and indicates recommendations for future studies.  
1. Theoretical Framework 
1.1 Gender Quotas in the Boardroom 
1.1.1 Definition 
Studies on gender quotas focus on two primary questions: 1) whether or not to apply 
quotas in certain corporate cultures and, if so, 2) how. The general definition of a gender 
quota identifies it as a legally prescribed form of affirmative action2 that sets a percentage 
objective to implement specific proportional representation of the underrepresented 
gender in management and/or supervising boards of the companies targeted (Kogut et al, 
                                                
2 Affirmative action also incorporates the mere indication of individual demographic characteristics that deserve 
consideration when recruiting (ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc.), without establishing a specific 
target. 
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2014; Lansing & Chandra, 2012).  However, it is possible to distinguish between soft 
quotas and hard quotas. Soft quotas amount to benefits attributed to collective entities for 
selecting members of the underrepresented group, serving as a positive stimulus. In turn, 
hard quotas correspond to the legal introduction of a mandatory target for the 
underrepresented group in boardrooms. In this sense, whenever referring to “quotas”, one 
generally means “hard quotas” corresponding to a legal form of affirmative action (Hall 
& Woermann, 2014). Therefore, and henceforth, this study simply indicates “quotas” 
whenever referring to hard quotas, and “soft quotas” whenever distinction is needed. 
When describing different quota implementation systems, authors usually make 
recourse to different classifications. However, the most common distinctions stem from 
the differentiations between mandatory and non-mandatory quotas (i.e., whenever for 
reference and voluntarily applied schemes), and among the mandatory, those that imply 
sanctions for non-compliance (with penalties ranging from losing state benefits to stock 
exchange delisting) and those that do not result in any kind of penalty (Isidro & Sobral, 
2015; Terjesen et al, 2015).  
1.1.2 Quotas: Controversies and Dilemmas 
Equality for all people is a fundamental socio-political goal. Therefore, there is also 
broad agreement that governments should promote and implement measures to counteract 
all forms of discrimination (Koch, 2015). However, in the case of gender quotas in 
corporations, the state legitimacy for interfering in the governing autonomy of private 
companies and shareholder choices of board directors has come in for question (Dale-
Olsen et al, 2013). The scope for reverse discrimination (against men, usually the 
overrepresented gender) and the effectiveness of a legal measure directed at a problem 
that mostly arises out of intricate cultural and sociological roots also contribute to the 
questioning of state interference through quotas. 
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There are three main controversial topics of discussion surrounding the debate on the 
legitimacy of quotas: 1) the justice of quota implementation (Brandth & Bjørkhaug 2015; 
Hall & Woermann, 2014; Lansing & Chandra, 2012; Terjesen & Sealy, 2016); 2) the 
compromise of meritocracy by quotas (Dale-Olsen et al, 2013; Kakabadse et al, 2015; 
Koch, 2015; Lansing & Chandra, 2012; Lending & Vähämaa, 2017; Terjesen & Sealy, 
2016); 3) and the implementation of work-life balance policies (Holst & Wrohlich, 2017; 
Koch, 2015; Lansing & Chandra, 2012; Sandberg, 2013; Wiersema & Mors, 2016). 
Regarding the justice of implementing quotas, some question their morality. In terms 
of the ethical justifications put forward for this, John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) 
sets out a theory of social justice that defends two principles: all civil liberties should be 
guaranteed to all individuals; and resources should be distributed in such a way that the 
less advantaged become the biggest beneficiaries and that equality of opportunities 
extends through society. The latter is inconceivable without the former and both are 
indispensable for any ethical evaluation. Thus, Rawls finds quotas morally unjustifiable3 
because they compromise equality of opportunities in order to guarantee the 
underrepresented gender holds the right to a seat in the boardroom, i.e., the second 
principle overrules the first. In turn, Robert Nozick’s Libertarian Theory of Justice rejects 
state intervention beyond the minimal state although he does consider intervention in the 
case of historical rectification, i.e., to compensate for disadvantages suffered by groups 
due to past events that are incoherent to contemporary social standards (e.g.: apartheid). 
However, he does not explain how to implement any such rectification – for instance, 
through quotas –, without sacrificing the premise that when individuals benefit from 
                                                
3 “(...) the use of soft and hard quotas (...) are – at least from the perspective of Rawls’ egalitarian theory – morally 
unjustifiable. The quota system suspends fair equality of opportunity in the name of securing equal liberties, but this 
represents a violation of procedural justice. The use of soft and hard quotas, therefore, cannot guarantee the justness of 
distributive outcomes, since these outcomes are themselves the consequence of unfair procedures (…)” (Hall & 
Woermann, 2014). 
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something acquired legitimately, i.e. due to their own merit, the state must not intervene 
to redistribute that benefit among others (Hall & Woermann, 2014).  
Overall, support for quotas stems from utilitarian rather than deontological principles 
with such grounds deeming state intervention necessary, good and useful to the promotion 
of equal opportunities, rather than simply considered just (Hall & Woermann, 2014). 
Hence, the fundamental role of a company is contributing towards economic and social 
development through its orientation towards its stakeholders. This utilitarian logic points 
to the economic advantages returned by corporate board diversity. Women get evaluated 
as underrated resources and as sources of important knowledge and experiences. This 
leads to the Wollstonecraft Dilemma: the pursuit of equality between men and women 
based on their similarities may lead to the measurement of women according to a male 
standard while arguments based on the differences between the two genders and their 
benefits to the board may actually disqualify women (because different characteristics 
imply different values). The binary thinking of whether to regard both genders as either 
similar or different represents a debate ongoing in feminist thinking even though there is 
not necessarily any opposition but rather a constant tension inherent to the meaning of 
gender4 (Brandth & Bjørkhaug, 2015). The pursuit of equality encapsulates the respecting 
of differences as both concepts are not necessarily exclusive. Therefore, are quotas 
justifiable? Terjesen & Sealy (2016) and Lansing & Chandra (2012) identify a utility 
rationale seeking to bring about an economically satisfying outcome, and a justice based 
rationale that defends fairness, individual and social equality. Both rationales provide 
frameworks for arguments both for and against quotas5.  
                                                
4 Characteristics and roles attributed by society and the self whether or not based on one’s sex. 
5 Examples of arguments of the utility rationale include: “diverse boards may increase financial performance” 
(argument for quotas); “homophilous boards bring consistency to board processes and decision-making” (argument 
against quotas). Examples of arguments of the justice rationale include: “qualified members of the underrepresented 
gender should have equal access to board seats” (argument for quotas); “no preferential treatment preventing equality 
of opportunities should be given to any specific demographic group” (argument against quotas). 
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Matters of fairness do not only derive from a selection process based on demographics 
but also include doubts around meritocracy (Kakabadse et al, 2015). Gender quotas may 
compromise selection processes based on qualifications, leading to gender bias and to the 
unnatural selection of qualified candidates from the underrepresented gender (Lending & 
Vähämaa, 2017). Some authors also warn of the risk of tokenism, reverse-discrimination, 
cases of nepotism and opposition to quotas among existing women directors, who may 
then feel stigmatized (Dale-Olsen et al, 2013; Koch, 2015; Lansing & Chandra, 2012). 
However, some arguments convey how quota systems are compatible with merit-based 
systems whenever the regulations put in place embody principles of efficiency and are 
complemented by networking and mentoring initiatives for women directors, and work-
life conciliation policies (Kakabadse et al, 2015).  
Another source of opposition against quota systems arises out of the argument that 
quotas are themselves insufficient when not backed up by structural work-life balance 
policies. These measures aim to provide comprehensive policies, flexibility and financial 
conditions for women directors to balance their career goals and family life, especially as 
regards parental leave (but not exclusively), and also encouraging men to develop other 
family roles besides that of primary bread-winner – with these policies being independent 
of gender (Koch, 2015).  
1.1.3 Impacts 
Some relevant studies in the literature assess the results of quota implementation in 
countries where quotas are in place. Most existing studies focus on the increase of female 
directors in European countries, particularly Norway, which has the longest period of 
implementation to date (Brandth & Bjørkhaug, 2015; Dale-Olsen et al, 2013; Wang & 
Kelan, 2013), France (Rosenblum & Roithmayr, 2015), Germany (Holst & Wrohlich, 
2017; Koch 2015), but also the US (Lansing & Chandra, 2012). More studies on the 
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“quality” of female nominations and the respective processes are required in order to 
assess the practical impacts of quotas. 
A study based on interviews with board directors in the US and Europe found that in 
countries with quotas there was not only an increase in gender diversity but also a “more 
professional and formal approach to board selection” (Wiersema & Mors, 2016). Wang 
& Kelan (2013) found that quota implementation in Norway increased gender equality in 
terms of women holding executive leadership positions while also reporting how women 
in independent non-executive positions raises the probability of a woman being appointed 
as board chair. On the contrary, Klettner et al (2016) found, for the same country, that 
female representation increased following quota implementation, but not in executive 
positions.  
The number of women on the executive boards of the 200 largest German companies 
remains only at a very low level even while having risen in the last year studied, especially 
on supervisory boards rather than on executive boards. Furthermore, authors also report 
a small but statistically significant positive relationship between a higher proportion of 
female supervisory board members and an increase in their proportion on executive 
boards (Hall & Woermann, 2014). In France, the quota triggered an immediate impact in 
increasing female representation that Rosenblum & Roithmayr (2015) interrelate with the 
desire of companies to secure beforehand the selection of “the most competent” women 
directors in the French corporate environment. Directors reported that higher board 
gender diversity positively affected decision-making and board dynamics because the 
new female members represented outsiders to the common elite networks, sometimes 
foreign nationals, holding degrees and experiences in non-traditional areas, i.e., thanks to 
all the other levels of diversity they brought in addition to their gender. 
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As regards the negative impacts, according to Terjesen & Sealy (2016), voluntary 
quota implementation policies that do not include sanctions for non-compliance are less 
likely to function in practice. In addition, disregard for a critical mass capable of 
guaranteeing structural equality may compromise the success of the measure. Finally, 
Wyss (2015) identifies three pitfalls to the economic rationale that encapsulate 
hypothetical negative outcome scenarios of quotas: instrumentalism (the selection of 
women as instruments of profitability, undervaluing their labor), essentialism 
(exacerbating biological differences between men and women capable of affecting 
economic outputs) and depoliticizing (the tendency to ignore conflicts between groups 
and social structures that maintain the existing hierarchies of power).  
1.2 Legislative Framework in Portugal 
In Portugal, the legislative framework establishing gender equality stems from, first 
and foremost, article 9, paragraph h) of the Constitution, which defines this as one of the 
fundamental duties of the state through the prevention of gender discrimination and the 
promotion of affirmative action. As a result, there are legal mechanisms that, in recent 
years, have given rise to a relatively consistent – although not actually effective – 
framework supporting gender balance in the workplace, specifically within firms6. 
Pointing to the insufficiency of past voluntary auto-regulatory mechanisms and the 
persistence of gender inequalities in corporations, the Portuguese government proposed 
draft law No. 52/XIII, “establishing the regime of balanced representation of men and 
women in management and supervisory boards7 of public sector organizations and listed 
companies”, on January 5th, 2017, which was then enacted by law No. 62/2017 on August 
                                                
6 See relevant legislative measures in appendix III. 
7 According to the Portuguese Company Code, article 278, there are three models of corporate governance for 
companies, regarding their management and supervisory bodies: 
a) Latin single model: board of directors (includes an executive commission) and fiscal council; 
b) Anglo-Saxon single model: board of directors (includes an executive commission), audit commission and 
statutory auditor; 
c) Dual model: Executive board of directors, general supervisory board and statutory auditor. 
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1st, 2017. The initiative seeks to promote gender equality in senior decision-making 
positions and forms part of a set of government initiatives for gender equality within the 
overall objective of generating sustainable economic growth, an efficient use of 
qualifications and competences and a more just and inclusive society.   
Law No. 62/2017 stipulates that the proportion of each gender sitting on management 
and supervisory boards (including executive and non-executive directors) of public 
companies can be no lower than 33.3% as from January 1st, 2018. For listed companies, 
this cannot be less than 20% as from the first elective general assembly held after January 
1st, 2018, and 33.3% as from the first elective general assembly after January 1st, 2020. 
Non-compliance by public companies results in the invalidity of the board’s nomination 
and a 90-day period for a new nomination. In the case of listed companies, the CMVM – 
the Portuguese Securities Market Commission – first issues a declaration reporting non-
compliance before a 90-day period to change the board’s appointment, after which, 
should non-compliance persist, a reprimand is then publicly handed down. Whenever the 
non-compliance still persists 360 days after the reprimand, the company becomes liable 
for the payment of a mandatory fine (not more than a month of salaries of board members 
for each semester of non-compliance). Law No. 62/2017 also defines how targeted 
companies ought to present annual plans for promoting both the equal treatment of 
genders and the conciliation between personal and professional lives. 
Terjesen et al (2015) investigated the factors that may drive governments to legislate 
over gender quotas for corporate boards. The authors propose a model featuring three 
institutional dimensions that raise the likelihood of recourse to gender quotas: the female 
labor market and the pre-existence of gendered welfare policies targeting female 
employers and conciliating working and family life; left-wing government coalitions; and 
a historical record of path dependency (legal initiatives for gender equality). Within this 
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framework, even non-binding mechanisms, such as codes of corporate governance and 
stakeholder expectations, can foster strong normative pressures. These result in a certain 
mimetic isomorphism, i.e., due to the incapacity to find solutions for uncertain conditions, 
firms choose to implement already existing systems (e.g. Norway), generating standard 
answers and a general institutional change. In Portugal, all three components were 
verified although, as identified by technical opinions from civil society entities8, there is 
a lack of structural measures capable of supporting the quota system, for example 
promoting wage equality and work-life balance measures that particularly target women. 
2. Empirical Study 
2.1 Methodology 
A qualitative methodology was used in order to better understand the expected impacts 
of gender quotas on promoting management board diversity among listed companies9. 
Specifically, the study objectives involved assessing the extent of gender discrimination 
within the Portuguese corporate context, the impacts of women on firm performances and 
the prevailing perceptions around quota outcomes. Most existing studies measure board 
financial performance through quantitative methods, pointing to the lack of qualitative 
studies in the CSR, gender and board performance literature. Accordingly, this study 
adopted a macro approach, through an interpretative data analysis method sourced from 
the EIGE, and a micro approach, applying semi-structured interviews. Both approaches 
are duly set out in the following sections. 
Interviews allow for the in-depth gathering of different perceptions, unexpected factors 
and holistic depictions, examining phenomena and actors in their own environments. In 
the case of board dynamics, these are essential to assessing the practical effects of 
                                                
8 Particularly those published by the National Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP-IN). 
9 Portuguese law No. 62/2017 targets management and supervisory boards of public and listed companies. However, 
the focus of this empirical study includes only the management boards (because these usually gain greater visibility 
within companies) of listed companies (because these represent a specific group of firms that choose a highly regulated 
public mechanism to obtain financing). 
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diversity that depend on individual relationships, corporate culture and decision-making 
processes – factors not susceptible to reduction to a few variables through quantitative 
methods (Cassel & Symon, 1994; Gephart, 2004). The objective here was to build up a 
comprehensive understanding of the topics under study by letting interviewees speak 
freely about their experiences. Regarding content analysis, the questions were prepared 
and organized in keeping with the main outcomes of the existing literature with the 
answers then coded and categorized accordingly.  
  PSI 20 firms were selected for interview 
due to their dimensions and 
representativeness in the Portuguese 
economy. Interviews were conducted with 
representatives from the following 
companies: BCP, CTT, Galp Energia, 
Novabase, Pharol, REN, a Portuguese energy sector company and two companies that 
wished to remain anonymous. The interviews lasted for a duration of 30 to 40 minutes 
and, except for one phone interview, took place face-to-face. Altri, Corticeira Amorim, 
EDP Renováveis, Ibersol, Jerónimo Martins, Montepio, Mota-Engil, NOS, The Navigator 
Company and Sonae Capital did not participate in this study either because the company 
was not available; because it did not answer the interview request; or it was still 
monitoring the consequences of the legislative proposal. Participants were members of 
human resource (four participants) and sustainability departments (three participants). 
Furthermore, one participant held the position of CFO and another served as CEO10. The 
participant age distribution was the following: two aged between 25 and 34 years old, 
                                                
10 Following a uniformity criterion, the identities of all interviewees remain anonymous. Respondent departments or 
positions held in the firm and their ages were not associated to each individual in order not to compromise their identity.  
INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
Respondents Gender Interview Recorded 
Respondent A Male Yes 
Respondent B Female Yes 
Respondent C Male No 
Respondent D Female No 
Respondent E Female Yes 
Respondent F Male Yes 
Respondent G Female Yes 
Respondent H Male No 
Respondent I Female Yes 
Table I 
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three between 35 and 44, and one between 45 and 54 with the three remaining aged 
between 55 and 64. Table I details the codes attributed to the respondents.                                                                                            
The interview script11 consisted of four groups of retrospective and prospective 
questions with each focused on a specific topic following a method of idea concentration 
through thematic analysis. Group I “General Perspectives” focused on interviewee ideas 
on gender equality and gender characteristics; group II “Portuguese Legislation” 
examined their views on quotas as a mechanism for promoting gender equality and, 
specifically, the terms of the Portuguese quota; group III “Quota Impacts” assessed 
company expectations of quota implementation; and group IV “Conciliation Measures” 
investigated work-life balance measures in place in the companies under study12.  
Groups I and II are necessarily directed at the personal views of participants, 
significant as these interconnect deeply with the personal experiences of interviewees in 
the organizations in which they work. There is a gender balanced representation among 
respondents, thus allowing for non-gender-biased answers to these groups of questions. 
Groups III and IV target their company positions towards the Portuguese legislation on 
quota implementation, revealing the receptivity of quotas among the firms targeted.  
2.2 European Framework 
Legislation on quotas differs geographically within Europe. Globally it is possible to 
define three main cases of enforcement: legislated mandatory quotas with sanctions for 
non-compliance, legislated quotas without sanctioning mechanisms and voluntary 
approaches based on self-regulation through codes of conduct or government 
recommendations (Isidro & Sobral, 2015). Regarding its targets, quotas can be directed 
                                                
11 See appendix I. 
12 Almost all company representatives interviewed mentioned some initiatives run by their firms in this area, which 
demonstrates how these organizations are not indifferent to this issue. Each firm’s initiatives reflect different 
approaches and the specific characteristics of each sector. However, company annual and sustainability reports rarely 
include specific chapters on work-life balance and, except for a few respondents, participants provided general answers 
to this group of questions. For this reason, it was decided to analyze this topic in future studies. 
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to publicly traded firms, companies with a certain minimum size (listed or unlisted) and 
majority-owned public companies (Koch, 2015). 
The table in appendix II summarizes the main aspects of the legal framework of 30 
European countries, namely, if quotas are implemented and in what terms (and if not, 
what kind of targets or approaches are in place), types of targeted companies, and 
additional national measures applied. Norway stands out, and is often mentioned in the 
literature, not only for being the first European country to legislate on gender quotas for 
corporate boards in 2003, but also because it sets one of the highest quotas (40%) and 
hardest sanctions for non-compliance. Other countries with mandatory quotas and 
sanctioning mechanisms are Belgium (33.3%), France (40%) and Italy (33%). In some 
countries, non-mandatory quotas were implemented and non-compliance is not 
sanctioned, as in Austria (35%), Greece (33.3%), and Spain (40%). In most countries 
there are government targets and recommendations, “comply or explain” mechanisms and 
voluntary approaches based on self-regulation (National Codes of Corporate 
Governance). Only in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden there are proposals 
for the implementation of corporate gender quotas. The European Commission forwarded 
a legislative proposal, in 2012, to establish 40% representation of the underrepresented 
gender in non-executive positions of listed firms by 2020. According to the Directorate 
General for Justice and Consumers, only 23.3% of board members of the largest publicly 
traded companies in the EU are women.  
 Figure 1 compares female representation in top decision-making positions in listed 
companies of European countries, in 2003 and 2016. It is possible to see that, overall, 
female representation increased in all European countries, and in countries that 
implemented gender quotas, this increase was higher (Belgium, France, Iceland, Italy and 
Norway). Figure 2 shows the proportion of men and women in the largest European listed 
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Source: Gender Statistics Database, EIGE (2017). Note: See differences in color scale (in 2003, scale is between 2% 
and 23%, and in 2016, scale is between 5% and 45%). 
 
Figure 2 
Source: Gender Statistics Database, EIGE (2017). Data analysis was undertaken by the author. 
Mara Sousa                                                                       Gender Diversity and Equality in the Boardroom: 
Impacts of Gender Quota Implementation in Portugal 
 16 
companies in 201713. Clearly, Iceland and Norway are the countries with the highest 
female representation, and in Norway women’s proportion is actually above its imposed 
quota (44%). In France and Italy, women’s representation corresponds to its gender quota, 
(42.1% and 32.9%, respectively) and Belgium is a little behind the required proportion 
(29.4%). However, it is in countries with no sanctioning mechanisms that the differences 
are more marked. In Austria, there is 19.3% of women’s representation, in Spain it is only 
21.5% and in Greece it is merely 9.3% - all are far behind the required quotas. This seems 
to prove Isidro & Sobral (2015) statement that “regulation without enforcement has 
virtually no effect promoting gender diversity on corporate boards” (p. 11).  
Figure 3 
Source: Gender Statistics Database, EIGE (2017). Data analysis was undertaken by the author. 
Figure 3 further supports this evidence, showing the evolution of women’s 
representation in the largest listed companies of the last three countries mentioned above, 
between 2005 and 2017. The general trend is of an increase of female representation in 
all countries. In Spain, this pattern started in 2007, when the quota was first introduced, 
                                                
13 See disaggregated positions for the year 2016 in sections a) and b) of appendix V. 
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but despite women’s representation steady growth over the years, it was not fast enough 
to ensure 40% representation by 2015. In Austria, after the introduction of the quota in 
2011, this indicator almost plateaued until 2013 (year of the first 25% milestone of the 
quota, which was not achieved). Afterwards, it presented a significant increase until 2015 
and a 2 percentage points decrease in 2016 to 18.1%. In Greece, the highest representation 
of women was registered in 2007 (11.2%), it suffered a sharp decrease in 2008 (5.7%) 
and has presented a modest growth over the years14.  
As presented in 
figure 4 Multiple 
Correspondence 
Analysis, there is a 
geographical pattern 
distinguishing types 
of quota enforcement, 
although it is 
inconclusive. Eastern 
countries usually 
present less than 
21.3% of female 
representation in boards of listed companies (median of all countries considered), have 
Gender Equality Index (GEI) scores under 48.4 (the median of scores of all countries 
considered), and have no implemented quotas (upper left quadrant). Central countries 
with quota systems and sanctions for non-compliance present more than 21.3% of female 
representation and have GEI scores over 48.4, as well as Northern countries that rank 
                                                
14 When analyzing the data presented in figure 3, one should keep in mind that, although some quota systems target 
only state-owned companies, the data available corresponds to listed companies, which may be public or private. 
Figure 4 
Source: Gender Equality Index, EIGE (2012) and appendix II. Data analysis was undertaken by 
the author, see table in appendix IV. 
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relatively well in the gender equality indicators considered, although none has quotas in 
place, except for Norway and Iceland (upper right quadrant). Greece, Spain and Austria 
have quota systems but no sanctions for non-compliance and perform poorly (lower left 
and right quadrants), as well as southern countries with no quotas (Cyprus, Portugal and 
Malta).   
2.3 Portuguese Context 
In Portugal, women make up 52.6% of the population. According to Pordata, in 2015, 
59% of graduates were women while 63% of all individuals holding Master’s degrees, 
and 54% of those holding PhDs were female. Nevertheless, women still remain 
underrepresented in all senior corporate decision-making positions in Portugal, even 
though there has been a slight increase in recent years, as detailed in figure 5.  
Figure 5 
Source: Gender Statistics Database, EIGE (2017). Data analysis was undertaken by the author. 
The lowest level of female board member representation in the highest decision-
making bodies of the largest listed companies in Portugal came in 2008 (only 2.6%). 
Since then, female representation has experienced steady growth and, in 2017, 15.5% of 
board members were women. Up until 2012, there are no records of any female executive 
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or non-executive members in the two highest decision-making bodies of each company. 
Only in 2016, were the first female CEOs registered, and with the first female presidents 
taking office in 2017, after a long period without female presidents. Nevertheless, the 
proportions depicted in figure 5 remain extremely low in relative terms, the reason why 
table II proves helpful in demystifying real female representation on boards. 
Table II presents the main characteristics of PSI 20 company (the largest companies 
publicly listed on the Portuguese stock exchange) board members, specifically average 
director age, qualifications and independence and especially focusing on gender. PSI 20 
companies are individually very different from each other, depending on their governance 
model and sector, which shape their corporate cultures and governance strategies. In 
particular, board sizes vary significantly (from three members in Ibersol to 21 members 
in BCP), which is meaningful when analysing female representation. In some cases, 
adding one or two women is enough to significantly increase female representation even 
while this does not apply in the case of larger boards. Even for smaller boards, compliance 
with the gender proportions required by law may still lack significant female influence. 
The median of female board directors is two and thus the median (and as well as the 
mean) female representation in PSI 20 firms is only 14%. The firms returning the highest 
levels of female board representation are Altri (28.57%), Sonae Capital (28.57%), CTT 
(30.77%), Sonae (33.33%) and Corticeira Amorim (33.33%). The latter two are the only 
companies that, at least in terms of the board of directors, comply with the new Portuguese 
quota law. However, there are no women sitting on most executive commissions. This 
means that even the few women holding board seats do not attain executive positions and, 
therefore, have only a reduced influence on decision-making relative to their male peers 
even though independent non-executive female directors take on important board of 
director supervisory roles. Sonae Capital constitutes the only exception to this scenario: 
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Altri 7 N/A 2 28.57% 4 0 0.00% No No Yes 0 7 0 3 
BCP 21 57.9 3 14.29% 8 1 12.50% No No No 7 21 5 6 
Corticeira 
Amorim 6 52.8 2 33.33% 3 0 0.00% No No Yes 0 5 0 3 
CTT 13 54.6 e) 4 30.77% 5 1 20.00% No No No 6 12 4 3 
EDP e) 8 53.4 0 0.00% 8 0 0.00% No No f) 8 g) 7 2 6 
EDP 
Renováveis 17 57.7 1 5.88% 4 0 0.00% No No No 10 17 11 7 
Galp 
Energia 19 55.6 3 15.79% 7 0 0.00% Yes No No 5 19 7 8 
Ibersol 3 N/A 0 0.00% 2 0 0.00% No No Yes 1 3 1 2 
Jerónimo 
Martins 9 59.9 1 11.11% 1 0 0.00% No No Yes 5 8 4 3 
Montepio 
e) 7 N/A 0 0.00% 7 0 0.00% No No f) 0 g) 7 1 4 
Mota- 
Engil 17 N/A 3 17.65% 8 0 0.00% No No No 3 17 4 3 
NOS 17 N/A 4 23.53% 7 1 14.29% No No No 1 14 2 11 
Novabase 4 52 0 0.00% 2 0 0.00% No No Yes 0 4 2 2 
Pharol 10 57.4 1 10.00% 2 0 0.00% No No Yes 3 10 2 6 
REN 12 52.3 2 16.67% 3 0 0.00% No No Yes 4 11 4 5 
Semapa 11 N/A 0 0.00% 4 0 0.00% No No No 3 10 1 3 
Sonae 9 59 3 33.33% 2 0 0.00% No No Sim 7 9 5 5 
Sonae 
Capital 7 54.1 2 28.57% 3 2 66.67% No Yes No 2 7 1 6 
The 
Navigator 
Company 14 N/A 0 0.00% 5 0 0.00% No No No 0 13 1 8 
               
Mean 11.1 55.3 h) 1.6 14.18% 4.5 0.3 5.97% - - - 3.4 95% 26% 48% 
Median 10.0 55.5 h) 2.0 14.29% 4.0 0.0 0.00% - - - 3.0 100% 24% 50% 
Mode 7.0 51 h) 0.0 0.00% 2.0 0.0 0.00% - - - 0.0 100% 0% 50% 
Standard 
Deviation 5.1 8.8 h) 1.4 12.21% 2.3 0.5 15.44% - - - 3.0 6% 18% 18% 
Max. 21 81 h) 4 33.33% 8 2 66.67% - - - 10 100% 65% 86% 
Min. 3 35 h) 0 0.00% 1 0 0.00% - - - 0 82% 0% 18% 
___________________ 
♀: Female 
N/A: Not Available 
a) The CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors. 
b) Descriptive statistics correspond to the proportion in percentage of degrees in each board. 
c) If an individual has a Master's Degree and a PhD, only one occurrence is counted. 
d) MBA, executive training, post-graduation. If an individual has more than one type of executive training, only one occurrence is counted. 
e) The age of one of the members is not available. 
f) Dual model (executive board of directors, general supervisory board and statutory auditor). 
g) Independent members of the executive board of directors. 
h) The ages of all individual members of each company were considered, and not the average age in each company indicated above.  
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out of its three executive commission members, two are women and one of these is the 
CEO – the only case of a female CEO in PSI 20 firms. Furthermore, Galp represents the 
only case of a female board chair. Analysis of female board representation must take into 
account the distinction between executive and non-executive members as the increase in 
female board representation may result only from increasing female non-executive 
members, reflecting tokenism (de Anca & Gabaldon, 2014; Klettner et al, 2016). As 
predicted by Nekhili & Gatfaoui (2013), there is no clear evidence that boards with a 
higher number of non-executive directors are more likely to appoint female directors.  
The average age of directors for all PSI 20 firms is 55 years old. In Sonae and Jerónimo 
Martins, the average age is higher (59 and 59.9, respectively), and lower in Novabase and 
REN (52 and 52.3, respectively). Nowadays, board directors belong to Generation X when 
women began fully accessing academic education, enabling an equal and fair assessment 
for the levels of qualifications attained. Hence, it would be expected that, other things 
being equal, today’s directors would be representative of both genders. Indeed, when 
analysing director qualifications, there are no significant differences between men and 
women. Globally, and apart from a couple of exceptions, all directors have undergraduate 
degrees, some have Master’s degrees, a few have PhDs and many have MBAs or other 
types of executive qualifications (usually more than one). This suggests the reasons why 
women are not reaching the boardroom arise out of other factors. 
2.4 Analysis of the Interviews’ Results 
2.4.1 Perceptions of gender equality 
Firstly, it was assessed to what extent interviewees perceived gender discrimination 
and the existence of the glass ceiling for senior management positions as a reality in the 
Portuguese corporate culture. Every participant, except for Respondent C, accepted the 
existence of a glass ceiling globally, although they all defended that this did not represent 
the current reality at the companies for which they work. Respondents E, H and I pointed 
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out that unequal gender representation very much depends on the company and its sector, 
with Respondent I identifying a bottleneck around the senior leadership positions in her 
firm. Furthermore, when confronted by the figures portraying the low female 
representation on PSI 20 company boards, all respondents presented several justifying 
factors. These fell into three categories: firm-specific, societal/cultural and gender-
related. Participants usually referred to more than one type of argument in their answers. 
Firm-specific arguments evoke the right and the authority of company shareholders 
to select board members. Respondents A, C, D, F and H explained that as board 
nominations are made by shareholders, gender parity does not depend either on the 
company or on its culture but on shareholder judgements of the fittest and most 
trustworthy candidates for directorships.  
“(…) male and female directors are always selected or nominated by shareholders, therefore the 
board of directors ends up not having that freedom [of selecting its directors] (…)”  
– Respondent F 
Societal/cultural factors were those most referenced by respondents through abstract 
depictions of Portuguese demographics and societal values they believe are reflected in 
company boards. Respondents B, D, E, G, H and I mentioned the different roles 
traditional Portuguese society attributes to the respective genders: women as housewives 
and primary care-givers and men as bread-winners. According to the views of participants 
B and D, these roles not only shape expectations towards members of both genders but 
also influence behaviors in the workplace. Men become expected to remain in the office 
after work to engage in informal gatherings that usually both discuss promotions and 
nurture business networks. Women rarely get to participate as they usually leave the 
office to head home and do the housework and take care of their children (commonly 
responsibilities not shared with their husbands) and thus seem less available for work: 
“(…) men interact more with each other, women go home at the end of the day, (…) because 
they have to take care of their other tasks and will not go out for drinks (…). Usually, it is in 
these moments that people are chosen and potential successors are considered (…) the model is 
Mara Sousa                                                                       Gender Diversity and Equality in the Boardroom: 
Impacts of Gender Quota Implementation in Portugal 
 23 
indeed dominated … by the masculine model and by men. And it’s natural that they choose men 
because they interact more with each other outside of work.” – Respondent B 
Moreover, Respondent C pointed out that today’s directors belong to a generation in 
which more men than women entered the corporate circles and that boards are tending to 
diversify overtime. Accordingly, Respondent I believed that over time the role of 
“primary care-giver” attributed to women will become independent from gender. 
Four respondents (B, D, H and I) referred, directly or indirectly, to gender-related 
factors, in the sense that most men seem to be members of relevant networks (“boys’ 
clubs”), from which women are somewhat excluded, thereby favouring male candidates.  
“It’s natural that they [men] tend to choose people from their circle of confidents.”  
– Respondent D 
Respondent I identified a corporate habit of neither including nor integrating women 
into discussions and decision-making as contributing to weak female representation: 
“Decision-making takes place within mostly male groups (…). In equal circumstances and 
following a logic of meritocracy (…) maybe, sometimes, decisions are made because we do not 
ask women if they are available” – Respondent I 
Respondent H mentioned that directors look for successors through a process of 
identification with themselves and that gender roles also interrelate with leadership 
characteristics attributed to each gender, especially assertiveness and aggressiveness in 
men, which are preferred in competitive environments. Regarding the female gender, 
Respondent E stated that women are often the first ones to limit themselves by being 
overly insecure about their capabilities and less prone to risk-taking than men: 
“Many times, women are their own constrainers, that is, when there’s an opportunity for career 
development, it is women who usually choose not to take the risk, because they tend to (…)  
better preserve the feeling of security (…). Women are less confident about their competences 
than men, which doesn’t amount to a rule [for all women].” – Respondent E 
2.4.2 Perceptions of gender diversity impacts 
 
Next, considerations around the impact of women on firm performance were 
examined. This question contained two focuses: financial performance and non-
financial performance. However, all interviewees initially mentioned factors related to 
non-financial performance in their answers, and only interviewees C and F did not think 
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gender diversity could have any impact on firm performances. Most interviewees (A, D, 
E, G, H and I) believed that diversity in all of the individuals’ characteristics, their points 
of view and backgrounds is susceptible to affecting decision-making, risk evaluation and 
strategic thinking, and not only gender diversity: 
“There are different ways of seeing the world and life that don’t come only from gender, they 
come from gender, from what we are as individuals, from where we grew up, what our social 
context is, our economic contexts, academic contexts, family contexts… all of this influences 
the way we see the world, not just the gender question, but that also has an influence.”  
– Respondent A 
Thus, when talking about outcomes, respondents distanced themselves from gender 
and with the most common argument being “competences are independent from gender”. 
Respondent E, however, believed more women in the boardroom contributes towards a 
more positive and ethical company image, which increases shareholder confidence and, 
therefore, investment, due to women being associated with more ethical attitudes. 
Similarly, Respondent B believed that female directors usually attribute a greater 
weighting towards sustainability related topics and boost their development within the 
organization. This opinion contrasted with that of Respondent G who believed male and 
female sustainability directors share equal concerns and that approaches depend more on 
the company’s sector and its impact on the environment and stakeholders than on gender.  
“(…) those assumptions of women being more closely associated with a certain kind of concern 
are wrong (…). It is actually very dangerous to assume those positions (…) that in reality are 
myths (…). There are very few female CEOs of oil and gas companies, for instance, but this does 
not mean that the sustainability concerns of those companies are less relevant.” – Respondent G 
When asked about financial performance, interviewees tended to repeat themselves 
and refer to the benefits of diversity in decision-making. Only Respondent D said that as 
female graduates are leaving university with higher grades relative to their male 
colleagues, hiring female talent is “good business” for companies, which also holds true 
for women in senior positions aiming for the board of directors. Similarly, Respondent E 
mentioned that organizations are now becoming aware of this and moving to increase 
female representation due to competition with other firms for new and diverse talent. 
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“We always want to be the best of the best (…) and the question of diversity and women in top 
management positions has become something perceived as positive for companies, something 
that will generate a return.” – Respondent E 
2.4.3 Views on quotas 
Subsequently, the interviews focused on the topic of quotas, their acceptability and 
expected impacts. Even those favorable to quotas expressed preference for other 
approaches to affirmative action, specifically company self-regulation (along with public 
scrutiny), fiscal incentives and rewards, and work-life balance initiatives. Only three 
respondents agreed with the implementation of quotas (B, E and H), with three against 
(C, G and I) and with three believing that taking into account the present scenario, they 
should be implemented, despite not being an ideal option (A, D and F). Follow-up 
questions tried to grasp the extent to which the respondent positions arose out of three 
main ethical dilemmas: reverse discrimination, meritocracy and state intervention. 
Individuals in favor of quotas strongly believed they might trigger behavior change 
due to their mandatory character and sanctions. They focused on the fact that, contrary to 
what one might think, quotas amount to more than a positive discrimination measure:  
“I think quotas can be really useful (…), not as a concept of positive discrimination but in the 
sense of equality, of giving equal opportunities (…).” – Respondent B 
In Respondent E’s understanding, the promotion of equal opportunities through quotas 
comes with rigorous selection criteria in order to prioritise overall candidate 
qualifications. Only after having secured these should applications by the 
underrepresented gender be favored:  
“(…) it’s about equality of opportunities, while always referring that, for equal talent, the 
underrepresented sex does benefit but always highlighting that the level of talent has to be the 
same (…).” – Respondent E 
Therefore, respondents rejected reverse discrimination. Respondent H termed the 
reverse discrimination argument “dishonest” and stated that unless we actually believe 
men are better at doing things, we cannot explain how among the top 100 there are 90 
men. This clashes with the opinions of Respondents C and I who deployed the argument 
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of meritocracy, but in reverse, explaining that quotas may compromise merit and prevent 
the most qualified candidates from being appointed if male.  
“(…) quotas are not sustainable in the long run, otherwise, firms would easily recruit non-
executive directors (…) and the matter would be solved. (…) It is not about gender equality but 
equality of opportunities (…) that’s why we defend merit.” – Respondent I 
Cultural factors were also applied reversely with Respondent G stating that such a 
mechanism makes more sense in highly conservative societies in which women do not 
enjoy the same civil liberties as men. Contrarily, Respondent E said that our gender-role-
based-society justifies the existence of quotas.  
“[In a] geographic area (…) where, in cultural terms, women do not have a role… in terms of 
the labor market (…) the existence of quotas may be a [necessary] mechanism to create a culture 
of diversity in those organizations.” – Respondent G 
“In Portugal, Spain, highly traditional, catholic countries, there are specific gender roles, and 
maybe, in Northern countries, there is not such a strong historical and religious component (…). 
Nowadays, we are in a more and more globalised world (…) and those cultural issues (…) have 
lesser importance.” – Respondent E 
Those who believe quotas are not the ideal option for promoting gender equality, 
understand the state’s intervention as stemming from the urgent need to change 
behaviors. They view quotas as a temporary mechanism and therefore reject the idea they 
may compromise merit or discriminate against men. 
“(…) I do not see these [quotas] as negative discrimination for men because I believe they are 
temporary, and, if this practice becomes generalized, quotas will stop making sense.” – 
Respondent A 
Specifically regarding the Portuguese quota15, only Respondents A and G came out 
in agreement with the overall proposal, particularly with both the percentage and the 
defined implementation period. Respondent C, however, strongly opposed the quota, 
considering it hastily proposed and resulting in one of the strictest frameworks in Europe. 
Respondents F and H believed the distinction between listed and unlisted companies as 
targets of the measure represents an additional burden for the former, before proposing a 
dimension criterion as more appropriate. Respondent E questioned the reasons behind the 
quota percentage, recalling how 33.3% represents only one woman on smaller boards, 
                                                
15 Some of the interviews were made before the draft law approval. 
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which may translate into tokenism and the subcriticality of women. Respondents B, C, D 
and I identified this goal as “ambitious” and potentially representing a “challenge” for 
most of the companies targeted. However, all company representatives guaranteed their 
organizations would be able to implement the quota but with only one of the anonymous 
firms and the energy sector company mentioning a bottom-up approach involving the 
broadening of their talent pool, investing in training their human resources from the start 
of their careers, and working on eliminating internal bias in career development and 
decision-making. 
Afterwards, it was attempted to understand the expected impacts of the Portuguese 
boardroom quota system in terms of fostering promotion of opportunities among qualified 
senior females, breaking the glass ceiling and improving decision-making dynamics. 
However, when asked about the feasible impacts, interviewees tended to repeat 
themselves and give similar answers to when asked about the impacts of women on 
financial and non-financial performance. After some follow-up questions, no one reported 
more women in the boardroom as likely having any specific impacts beyond representing 
additional motivation for younger female professionals:  
“I think women “attract” women, especially in management. When there’s the perception that 
that person achieves a certain position, there are more people showing up for that position, 
because, suddenly, the dream comes true (…).” – Respondent E 
Respondents A and B did not expect any impact. Respondent A mentioned gender 
leadership characteristics to argue that, from his own experience, these are mere 
stereotypes and individuals usually do not conform with them, giving the example of the 
belief that some women directors have a more emotional and sensitive – i.e., feminine –, 
approach, and others a more aggressive – i.e. masculine – posture.  
“(...) [when we talk about] women who manage in a little more ‘masculine’ way, a little less 
relational – even though here we are talking about stereotypes too –, we’re supposing that women 
manage in a more emotional way than men (...); during my career (...) I’ve worked with people 
that do not fit these typologies (...)” – Respondent A 
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Respondents E and G referred to impacts in terms of diversity in general (across all 
its dimensions), and not just gender diversity, as an advantage in decision-making. 
“I consider (…) diversity as a competitive advantage (…), it prepares boards more adequately 
for decision-making, which is, obviously, positive in that perspective.” – Respondent G 
Respondents C, D, H and I referred to some specific impacts of the quota measure. 
Respondent C expressed concern over the changes necessary to executive commissions 
because each executive member usually holds a specific portfolio. Hence, either some 
portfolios would have to be split, or more created, or male members would have to leave 
in order to integrate women directors. Respondent D mentioned improvements to 
company public images and the social impact as positive outcomes of the measure 
alongside Respondent I who added that by valuing and investing in diversity, firms 
contribute to changing mentalities and nurturing their internal and external images, 
reflecting the Perrault (2015) and Rao & Tilt (2016) findings. Respondent H referred to 
the benefits of diversity in general but, above all, diversity among women themselves, 
i.e., as women begin accessing senior positions, they gain the opportunity to develop 
individual competences and become valued for them and not for gender-related aspects.  
Nevertheless, as no answer referred to negative aspects, when confronted with this 
possibility, participants had much more to say, particularly regarding follow-up questions 
on tokenism and meritocracy, and usually mentioning more than one type of impact. 
Respondents A, H and I denied the possibility of negative impacts. Respondent I 
mentioned, briefly, eventual difficulties in managing change and reorganizing teams. 
“(…) maybe performance will decline temporarily a little, and then increase significantly, but 
that happens in all learning processes.” – Respondent I   
 Respondent A mentioned that the likelihood of selecting unqualified members 
remains questionable as both men and women have similar levels of qualifications 
following the access of women to education becoming a reality many years ago. 
Furthermore, even if there were signs of tokenism in the early years of implementation, 
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Respondent H did not believe this would compromise the positive impacts of the measure. 
Respondents D, E and F, however, mentioned tokenism as a possibility. Respondent D 
explained that were women to feel favored because of their gender, this might pose a real 
obstacle to their performance. Respondent E pointed to the need for a critical mass of 
women in order to avoid tokenism, and difficulties in changing the mindset of workers in 
more conservative companies that perceive quotas as unfair positive discrimination in 
favor of women:  
“We need time to explain people the reasons for supporting quotas (…), and sometimes, that is 
time companies do not want to waste, (…) it is difficult to work in a culture with which people 
can’t identify (…), we would be evangelizing people (…). People will always think: ‘oh so we’re 
getting rid of good men to give women their positions’ – and that is not true.” – Respondent E 
Respondent F predicts the appearance of Golden Skirts and only Respondent C 
expressed concerns over meritocracy and either the selection of less qualified people or 
the non-rewarding of those most qualified.  
“(…) there will be women in board cycles and they will end up being in several places 
[boardrooms], and sometimes they will not be chosen on merit. They will be chosen just because 
they are women and have already held that position so they can do it again in other places.”  
– Respondent F 
Respondent G mentioned negative impacts of the measure to the public images of 
companies as quotas may lead to the false impression that companies are only promoting 
female representation because it became mandatory by law. This does not fit in with any 
of the categories above and also contrasts with the opinions of Respondents D and I who 
perceived the quota as resulting in positive impacts and improvements to company 
images. 
“This gives the wrong idea about the concerns of organizations as regards equality of 
opportunities because it gives the false idea that we only do so out of a matter of legal obligation.”      
– Respondent G 
“(…) to lead by example in that matter, so those at the bottom understand that it is possible to 
diversify and that it [diversity] is valued.” – Respondent I 
2.5 Discussion of Results 
As predicted by Terjesen et al (2015), at the time of approving the quota legislation, 
Portugal had all three components in place for implementation, in particular, a left-wing 
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government coalition and a record of path dependency of previous measures in this field 
(appendix III). However, implementing a 33.3% quota by 2018 does represent a 
significant challenge for the largest listed companies. Although guaranteeing they will be 
able to meet the quota, the interviews revealed how some firms are not favorable to the 
mechanism chosen. A slightly longer period of implementation, of two to six years, 
similar to other European countries, might not only have facilitated adjustment to the 
quota but also have allowed for raising awareness among all the parties involved. This is 
important because, on some boards, achieving a 33.3% proportion may imply the 
nomination of only one woman. Ideally, female nominations should not be stigmatized 
as the token women or the “Other”, although this may be initially a risk as female director 
competences may get overlooked because of their gender. 
As shown in 2.2, quota implementation in European countries has been successful 
increasing female board representation when joined by non-compliance sanctions, 
contrarily to those without. This suggests that, taking into account that earlier self-
regulation approaches in Portugal did not have practical results, the quota system could 
trigger change. Besides, as Respondent H mentioned, organizations respond better to 
sanctions than to benefits, because in case of non-compliance, the first implies necessarily 
a loss, while in case of non-action everything remains the same with the second. 
Overall, respondents were quite open to discussing the topics under study. However, 
most encountered difficulties in conveying the formal positions of their firms on quota 
legislation. They instead mostly expressed their personal opinions and experiences, even 
while still valid given these reflect the realities of their firms. It would thus seem that 
there may yet not have been substantial internal discussion, which raises concerns due to 
the tight timeline for implementing the quota. This aspect along with which companies to 
target and the appropriate level of the quota (to avoid tokenism and subcriticality) formed 
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the doubts raised by respondents. Specifically, some respondents suggested that public 
and state administrated companies should be the first to set the example, and that the 
quota would harm listed companies by imposing an additional burden to them. Moreover, 
some defended that a dimension criterion would have been more adequate as some listed 
companies are small/family-run firms. Regarding the quota type, many were in favor of 
soft quotas, especially self-regulatory approaches, while others stated that, taking into 
account the present context, hard quotas are a necessary instrument for driving change. 
This in turn encapsulates the different conceptions surrounding the best way of triggering 
cultural and behavioral changes and the controversies existing between hard and soft 
approaches (Klettner et al, 2016). 
In light of the results obtained, the interviews reveal some noteworthy patterns: a) as 
described above, gender did not hold any clear influence on the acceptability of quotas 
(two women and one man were in favor and two women and one man were against). This 
instead depended more on respondent experiences, company backgrounds, company 
cultures and, ultimately, individual values; b) in terms of age, there were no clear 
differences among the answers given; c) female director seniority did make a difference: 
females with long careers within their companies were usually against quotas and seemed 
protective of their status quo. They usually held top positions and stated they would not 
like to benefit because of their gender because this would devalue their individual 
competences. This conveys the risk of female director opposition to quotas as predicted 
in the literature; d) some respondents note that sometimes women impose obstacles on 
themselves: they tend to be less aggressive, less participative in stating their suggestions 
and in decision-making, they hesitate when an opportunity or challenge emerges, and 
appear insecure as to their own competences and abilities to play a businessperson role 
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alongside that of mother/wife. The literature reports this as a generalized remark in 
opposition to supposed greater assertiveness of males (Lansing & Chandra, 2012). 
Regarding respondent perceptions of gender equality, “societal/cultural arguments” 
constituted the most mentioned facet and, nowadays, seem to reflect a long overdue 
demand of second-wave feminism that, in the late 1960’s, had questioned gender roles 
and the division of tasks in western households. In turn, “gender-related” answers 
identified – directly or indirectly –, homophily, power relations, gender stereotypes 
unfavorable to women and the so-called “boys’ clubs” as responsible for excluding 
women from eligible positions, relevant networks and favoring male candidates. 
Concerning the impacts of gender diversity, most interviewees considered 
competences as independent from gender and did not allow for any positive relationship 
between gender diversity and financial performance. However, most also considered this 
beneficial to non-financial performance, decision-making processes and board dynamics 
as a trait of diversity, and not specifically because of gender. 
Nevertheless, the legitimacy of quotas remains a controversial ongoing debate. The 
antagonistic views on reverse discrimination, tokenism, golden skirts and meritocracy 
mentioned by respondents emerge in the findings presented. This reflects the current 
debate among researchers and corporate workers as regards the following topics: the 
scope for quotas to represent an unfair positive discrimination measure favoring women 
and leaving men in a disadvantaged position; the risk of female directors being appointed 
not for their competences but for symbolic purposes (and of getting appointed to more 
than one directorship); and the compromising of merit in selection processes. These topics 
were broadly present in different respondent answers. Furthermore, the opinions that 
boardroom gender diversity improves company public and internal images as well as 
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worker trust, reflects the Perrault (2015) and Rao & Tilt (2016) findings, even though one 
participant defended the opposite.  
Respondents made important comments on adapting to the measure with some 
concrete suggestions: businesswomen ought to be very clear and assertive concerning 
their professional objectives, salaries and interpersonal relations in the company. In turn, 
companies themselves have to guarantee rigorous selection criteria, mentoring 
opportunities and explain the importance of quotas to their workers and how, if well 
implemented, they will not compromise merit; the role of education in promoting gender 
equality, deconstructing stereotyped frameworks and shaping positive and sustainable 
social behaviors in order for quotas to be unnecessary in the future.  
Conclusion 
This dissertation’s main objective was to identify the likely impacts of the 33.3% 
gender quota for management boards in Portugal in order to understand the terms on 
which gender quotas may or may not trigger sustainable gender balances in the boardroom 
and change in the corporate culture. This work deployed data analysis and semi-structured 
interviews to investigate the existence and constraints of the glass ceiling in Portuguese 
corporate culture, perceptions on quota outcomes and the perceived impacts of women 
on firm performance. Examining this topic from the perspective of organizations made it 
possible to assess the receptiveness to the quota system that will come into effect in 2018.  
The starting hypotheses suggested that quotas may increase the boardroom 
participation of the underrepresented gender but while also raising legitimacy concerns. 
Globally, the interviews approached this dilemma positively. However, the literature 
review and data analysis suggested a more complex answer to the research question. The 
success of any quota system deeply depends on its formulated terms, on a country’s 
corporate culture, on social receptivity and, at the micro level, on the sector an 
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organization belongs to. Therefore, as seen in European countries where quotas do not 
have sanctioning mechanisms, their capacity to sustainably increase female 
representation only ever proves very modest (Austria, Spain and Greece). Furthermore, 
the analysis of the European context also shown that there is no strong positive evidence 
that the adoption of quota systems is more likely in certain regions as a result of 
cultural/societal differences among European countries. For instance, Norway, Iceland, 
Germany, France, Belgium and Italy all have quotas in place, despite representing 
different socio-cultural and political realities within Europe. Nevertheless, it was clearly 
verified that in countries with quotas, female representation and gender equality is usually 
higher than in countries without quotas, as it would be expected.  
Moreover, cultural aspects, ethical values and views on meritocracy hold great 
influence over corporate social dynamics and over the acceptance of quota as testified to 
in the interviews. Furthermore, views on these topics divided broadly. Participants 
attributed great weighting to society’s instituted gender role expectations. The interviews 
demonstrate how quota acceptability is independent from gender as are perceptions 
around the benefits of gender diversity. Thus, quota acceptability varies according to the 
personal values, experiences and corporate backgrounds of individuals. Correspondingly, 
although some respondents recognized benefits for board dynamics from the different 
traits inherent to both genders, others strongly denied gender diversity having any impact 
on firm financial performances. 
Regarding the main objective of this study, it is possible to conclude that, in the 
Portuguese case, its record of path dependency, i.e., earlier legal initiatives, are significant 
to the success of the quota system. Previous soft approaches established the necessary 
impulse for hard quota implementation although some technical and legal opinions have 
criticized the legal quota framework. The quota system will most likely guarantee a 
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gender balance in the boardroom at a sustainable level. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
ascertained whether or not this will trigger change in corporate mentalities and cultures 
as respondent answers were divided. However, data analysis made it clear that the glass 
ceiling is a contemporary reality to the Portuguese corporate context.  
There are some recognized limitations to this analysis. Despite several interview 
requests, some PSI 20 firms did not participate in this study, which decreased its potential, 
as the interview method requires a varied number of testimonials. Additionally, the firm 
representatives interviewed were neither all board members nor members of the same 
departments, which invariably results in different perspectives on the topic under 
research. Furthermore, interviewer subjectivity and inaccuracies in the interpretations of 
answers pose risks, although open-ended questions were asked in order to minimize 
answer biases. Moreover, the impacts of gender diversity on firm financial and social 
performances might have been further developed. In particular, future studies should 
strictly define the dimensions to performance and test for the impacts of gender diversity 
through qualitative methods in order to measure the actual impacts of the quota after a 
certain distance in time following implementation. Given this study assesses the potential 
of hard quotas as a gender equality instrument, it is important to examine their actual 
outcomes, similar to quantitative studies on the Norwegian case and other countries with 
longer established quota systems. However, the introduction of qualitative methods in a 
later phase would be equally relevant in order both to overcome the limitations of 
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Appendix I: Interview script 
 
Recorded interview: Yes             No   
 
Information about the respondent: 
Anonymity: Yes             No   
Name:  
Age:  




Information about the company: 
Anonymity: Yes             No   
Name: 
Company: Private              Public   
Board size: 
Number of male directors:                    Number of female directors: 
Chair of the board:                                Gender: 
Positions of female directors: 
 
I. Topics on gender (in)equality 
 
1. Do you consider Portuguese women still face a “glass-ceiling”, i.e., significant 
obstacles accessing to top positions in the corporate context? If yes, to what 
extend? 
2. In boards of directors of the largest listed companies in the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange there is still a majority of male directors. What prevents bigger female 
participation? 
3. In your opinion, what is the impact in terms of performance from a bigger 
presence of women in boards? 
4. How do you see quota implementation in boards of directors? 
Follow up questions: 
- As a way to create gender equality or as reverse discrimination (against men)? 
- Are quotas meritocratic? 
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II. Portuguese Law 
 
5. Assuming there are hard quotas and soft quotas, with which one/s of the following 
measures do you agree more? Why? 
- Implementation of a certain proportion of the underrepresented gender in boards; 
- Raising awareness for the importance of gender balance; 
- Suggesting an advisable minimum proportion of the underrepresented gender for 
voluntary implementation; 
- Sanctions for companies that do not have a certain minimum percentage of the 
underrepresented gender in boards; 
- Benefits for companies that hire/nominate individuals of the underrepresented 
gender. 
6. What is your position on draft law No. 52/XIII? Specifically, do you think that the 
value of the quota (33.3%) for state-owned companies and listed companies (the 





7. What measures is the company going to take in order to follow the law proposal 
(in case it is approved/now that it is approved)? What are the expected changes in 
terms of the board of directors? 
8. What impacts do you think this law will have on the company? 
 
IV. Work-life balance measures 
 
9. What measures has the company been developing for balance between 
professional careers and personal lives of directors and also collaborators in 
general?  
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Appendix II: Gender balance legislation on corporate decision-making positions 





Type of Legislation Year Applicable to Sanctions Other national 
measures in place 
Austria Yes Non-mandatory quota 
of 25% of women on 
supervisory boards by 
2013 and 35% by 2018 
2011 State-owned 
companies 
No Self-regulation: 2012 
Austrian Code of 
Corporate Governance 
(w/ explicit principles) 
Belgium Yes Requirement of at least 
33% of each gender in 
boards of state-owned 
companies (by 2012), 
listed companies (by 
2017) and listed SMEs 
(by 2019) 








appointment of any 
director who do not 





Bulgaria No - - - - No 
Croatia No - - - - No 
Cyprus No - - - - No 
Czech 
Republic 
No - - - - No 
Denmark No 




should ‘as far as 
possible’ have gender 
balanced boards, and by 
2013 legislation 
requires large 
companies to set 
voluntary targets for the 
proportion of the under-







(fine in case no 
targets are set) 
Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance 
in 2010 (with explicit 
principles) 
Estonia No - -  - No 
Finland No Boards of state-owned 
companies are required 
to have an ‘equitable 




No Government’s equality 
policies and Corporate 
Governance Code 
France Yes Quota of 20% of women 
on the board to be 
achieved by 2014, and 
40% by 2017 









over €50 million 
Yes 
(fees will not be 
paid to directors; 
nullification of the 
board elections 
although  the 
decisions adopted 







Quota of 30% of women 
on board in supervisory 
boards of listed 
companies 
that are submitted to 
parity co-determination 
 




2013; void the 
appointment of any 
director who does 
not conform to the 
30% quota) 
Other companies that 










33% of state appointees 
to boards of state-
owned companies must 
be from each gender 





No Soft positive action 
measures in the public 
sector 
 
Hungary No - - - - Soft positive action 
measures in the public 
sector  
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Iceland Yes Quota of 40% of women 
on the board to be 
achieved by 2013 













(there is a 
proposal) 
- - - No Voluntary initiatives; 
Policy target of 40 % 
female participation on 
all state boards and 
committees; Soft 
positive action 
measures in public 
sector employment; 
2012 UK Corporate 
Governance Code and 




Italy Yes 33% quota of each 
gender in boards by 
2015 (with a target of 
20% for the transitional 
period) 










directors may lose 
office) 
No 
Latvia No - - - - Soft positive action 
measures in the public 
sector.  
Lithuania No - - - - No 
Luxembourg No - - - - Soft positive action 
measures.  
Ten Principles of 
Corporate Governance 
of the Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange in 
2009 (with explicit 
principles) 
Malta No - - - - No 
Netherlands No 
(there is a 
proposal) 
Target of 30% in the 
executive and 
supervisory boards. 
Measure to expire in 







2008 Dutch Corporate 




Norway Yes Mandatory 40% quotas 
for women on the 




















Poland No Executive ordinance of 
the Minister of State 
Treasury obliges to 
‘choose adequately 
prepared members of 
supervisory boards, 
taking into account the 
balanced participation 
of women and men’. 
The Code of good 
practices attached 
establishes a target of 
30% for 2015 and a 




No Voluntary targets; 
2011 Code of Best 
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Portugal Yes Mandatory 33.3% quota 
of the underrepresented 
gender on executive and 
supervisory boards, to 
be achieved by 2018 by 
public firms and by 
2020 by listed firms 







(90 days to appoint 
a new board in case 
of non-compliance, 
after which there 
will be a public 
declaration of non-
compliance; 
one year of non-
compliance will 





Requirement of gender 
equality plans 
Romania No - - - - Soft positive action 
measures in public 
sector employment 
Slovakia No - - - - No 
Slovenia No Regulation on state-
owned companies: 40% 
representation of each 










Spain Yes Quota of 40% of each 
gender on the boards by 
2015 





250 or more 
employees 
Yes, soft 
(It is rather a 
recommendation by 
nature. Lack of 
compliance impacts 
consideration for 




Soft positive action 
measures in public 
sector employment 
Sweden No 
(there is a 
proposal) 
- - - - Voluntary initiatives; 
Self-regulation: 2010 
Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code sets 
a voluntary goal of 
parity for listed 
companies – “comply 
or explain” 
mechanism. 










recommendation of a 
25% women directors 
target by 2015 for 
listed companies, and 
that smaller companies 
set their own targets by 





Yes Quota of 40% for the 
under-represented 
gender by 2020 
2012 Non-executive 
positions of 





(Those who fail to 
comply with the 





Source: Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Jourová, 2016; Terjesen et al, 2015. Table was created by the author. 
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Appendix III: Legislative measures on gender balance in the corporate 







Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers No. 49/2007 
State that publicly owned companies shall adopt equality 
plans aiming at promoting equality of opportunities for both 
genders, as well as the conciliation of personal and 
professional lives. 
Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers No. 70/2008 
Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers No. 19/2012 
Defines the adoption of gender equality measures for 
management and supervisory boards of state companies, 
namely through equality plans. Moreover, recommendations 
are made to private companies listed on the national stock 
exchange and requests that the state, as a shareholder of 
private companies, suggests gender equality measures to 
other shareholders. 
Framework law of the independent 
administrative entities with functions 
of regulating the economic activity of 
the private, public and cooperative 
sectors, approved by law No. 67/2013 
Guarantees gender rotation in the chairs of executive boards 
and 33% representation of each gender for board members. 
Decree-law No. 133/2013 Defines gender diversity in executive and supervisory boards 
and the promotion of gender equality as part of organizations’ 
social responsibilities. 
Decree-law No. 157/2014 States that the selection of board members should promote 
diversity of qualifications and calls for increases to the 
number of members of the underrepresented gender (targeted 
companies should report to the Bank of Portugal what 
measures they took in this field). 
Decree-law No. 159/2014 Establishes that both higher female representation on 
executive and management boards and greater wage equality 
are factors for consideration in selecting company 
applications for EU Cohesion Funds. 
Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers No. 11-A/2015 
Instructs members of the government to establish a 
compromise agreement for gender equality with thirteen 
publicly traded companies with a goal of 30% participation 
of the underrepresented gender by the end of 2018. 
 
Source: Commission for Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Liberties and Guarantees (CACDLG) legal advice to 
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Appendix IV: Multiple Correspondence Analysis’ variables 
 
Country Country Abbreviation Region 
Quotas 












Austria AT Center 
Yes, 
without 
sanctions 19.3 50.2 0.389 -2.372 
Belgium BE Center 
Yes, 
with 
sanctions 29.4 58.2 1.609 -0.68 
Bulgaria BG East No 12.8 38.5 -1.141 0.501 
Croatia HR East No 22.6 39.8 -0.532 0.773 
Cyprus CY South No 10.7 44.9 -1.008 -0.688 
Czech 
Republic CZ East No 17.1 43.8 -1.141 0.501 
Denmark DK North No 28 70.9 0.826 0.891 
Estonia EE East No 7.4 49.8 -0.533 0.44 
Finland FI North No 32.3 72.7 0.826 0.891 
France FR Center 
Yes, 
with 
sanctions 42.1 55.7 1.609 -0.68 
Germany DE Center 
Yes, 
with 
sanctions 29.7 55.3 1.609 -0.68 
Greece EL South 
Yes, 
without 
sanctions 9.3 38.3 -0.876 -2.495 
Hungary HR East No 13.9 41.6 -1.141 0.501 
Iceland IS North 
Yes, 
with 
sanctions 43.7 - 1.818 0.842 
Ireland IE North No 17.3 56.5 0.217 0.618 
Italy IT South 
Yes, 
with 
sanctions 32.9 41.1 0.344 -0.803 
Latvia LV East No 27.9 46.9 -0.532 0.773 
Lithuania LT East No 14.1 40.2 -1.141 0.501 
Luxembourg LU Center No 11 55.2 0.256 -0.565 
Malta MT South No 7 46.8 -1.008 -0.688 
Netherlands NL North No 30.2 68.5 0.826 0.891 
Norway NO North 
Yes, 
with 
sanctions 44 - 1.818 0.842 
Poland PL East No 19 43.7 -1.141 0.501 
Portugal PT South No 15.5 37.9 -1.008 -0.688 
Romania RO East No 8.4 33.7 -1.141 0.501 
Slovakia SK East No 22.9 36.5 -0.532 0.773 
Slovenia SI East No 21 57.3 -0.533 0.44 
Spain ES South 
Yes, 
without 
sanctions 21.5 53.6 0.34 -2.283 
Sweden SE North No 35.5 74.2 0.826 0.891 
UK UK North No 27.7 58 0.826 0.891 
 
Source: Gender Equality Index, EIGE (2012) and data collected in appendix II. 
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Source: Gender Statistics Database, EIGE (2017). Data analysis was undertaken by the author. 
 
 
Appendix VI: Portugal’s 26th position (among EU 28 countries) in the Gender 
Equality Index* 
 
Source: Gender Equality Index, EIGE (2012). Data analysis was undertaken by the author. 
 
 *The Gender Equality Index is calculated by the EIGE and assesses gender equality in 
the EU policy context. Scores from 0 to 100 are available for years 2005, 2010 and 2012. 
This index includes the following domains: work, money, knowledge, time, power, 
health, intersecting inequalities and violence. 
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Source: National Survey on the Uses of Time, Policy Brief, (Perista et al, 2016), Center of Studies for Social 












































Source: National Survey on the Uses of Time, Policy Brief, (Perista et al, 2016) CESIS & CITE. 
